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Abstract
A wrong audit can cause damages to shareholders. This happens especially
if outside shareholders base their investment decision on the audit and buy
overpriced company shares. If such damages are recoverable under an implied
contract between auditor and shareholder, the auditor is usually liable for sim-
ple negligence. In that case he has negligently violated a contractual duty to the
shareholder, even though the explicit contract was between him and the corpo-
ration. If however these damages are only recoverable under tort law, simple
negligence will not lead to compensation because they are pure economic losses
and because most legal orders restrict or exclude liability for pure economic loss.
For such damages, most legal orders grant compensation under tort law only
if it is proven that the tortfeasor was willful, disloyal, reckless or grossly neg-
ligent . In most cases this excludes compensation. The economic literature on
civil liability for economic loss has underlined the rationale for such restrictions.
However, this literature remains silent with respect to the borderline between
contract law and tort law. There is a general agreement that pure economic
loss has to be compensated under contract law as the cost of this protection is
internalized in the contract. If a wrong audit and a wrong and published bal-
ance sheet causes a pure nancial loss to a shareholder, should this be regarded
as a violation of contractual duties between the auditor and the shareholder, or
just as a tort? Obviously, in most cases this question is decisive for whether
the plainti receives compensation or not. We argue that this question should
be answered in the armative, if the victim has an ex-ante willingness to pay
for the costs associated with performing such a duty. In this article we argue
that a wrong audit that causes damages to shareholders should generally be
strictly regarded as a tort case. We also argue that a rule of gross negligence or
of gross violation of professional standards in tort law can avoid the problems
of underdeterrence as well as of overdeterrence in the compensation of pure -
nancial loss in tort. However, we also argue that a wrong audit should lead to
contractual liability, if it was made to prepare the sale of a company or parts
of it from inside investors to outside investors or to prepare an initial public
oering. Under this condition we argue that the economic rationale for restrict-
ing compensation for pure nancial loss is not given. The paper rst analyses
the social value of an audit. Then several liability rules with precise and vague
levels of professional care are treated with respect to their incentive eects. This
leads to the proposal of a rule of gross negligence in tort law. In the last part
we analyse the special conditions, under which the legal order should assume
a contract with protective consequences for buyers of company shares, which
leads to liability for simple negligence. The legal form of a contract with pro-
tective consequences for third parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung f ur Dritte)
is borrowed from German dogmatic scholarship, but may be interesting in thisrespect for an international audience as well. This article draws from the lit-
erature on pure nancial losses and from the literature on precise and vague
negligence norms as well as from the literature on the tort contract boundary .
The article does however not discuss the problem of joint and several liability
and the strategic problems involved, which have been broadly discussed in the
literature. The victim of a wrong audit might have a claim against the inside
investor, the management, the rm and/or the auditor. This causes strategic
interactions, which inuence the level of care of all actors as well as the price
of auditing . These problems have been extensively dealt with in the literature
and are left out here completely. The focus is exclusively on the question, under
which conditions the victim should be highly protected by contract law or get
a lower level of protection under tort law.1
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A. Introduction
A wrong audit can cause damages to shareholders. This happens especially if outside shareholders
base their investment decision on the audit and buy overpriced company shares. If such damages 
are recoverable under an implied contract between auditor and shareholder, the auditor is usually 
liable for simple negligence. In that case he has negligently violated a contractual duty to the 
shareholder, even though the explicit contract was between him and the corporation. If however 
these damages are only recoverable under tort law, simple negligence will not lead to compensation 
because they are pure economic losses and because most legal orders restrict  or exclud e liability for
pure economic loss. For such damages, most legal orders grant compensation under tort law only if 
it is proven that the tortfeasor was willful, disloyal, reckless or grossly negligent
1. In most cases 
this excludes compensation. The economic literature on civil liability for economic loss has 
underlined the rationale for such restrictions. However, this literature remains silent with respect to 
the borderline between contract law and tort law. There is a general agreement that pure economic
loss has to be compensated under contract law as the cost of this protection is internalized in the 
contract. If a wrong audit and a wrong and published balance sheet causes a pure financial loss to a 
shareholder, should this be regarded as a violation of contractual duties between the auditor and the 
shareholder,  or just as a tort? Obviously, in most cases this question is decisive for whether the 
plaintiff receives compensation or not. We argue that this question should be answered in the 
affirmative, if the victim has an ex-ante willingness to pay for the costs associated with performing 
such a duty. 
In this article we argue that a wrong audit that causes damages to shareholders should generally be 
strictly regarded as a tort case. We also argue that a rule of gross negligence or of  gross violation 
of professional standards in tort law can avoid the problems of underdeterrence as well as of 
overdeterrence in the compensation of pure financial loss in tort. However, we also argue that a 
wrong audit should lead to contractual liability, if it was made to prepare the sale of a company or 
parts of it from inside investors to outside investors or to prepare an initial public offering. Under 
this condition we argue that the economic rationale for restricting compensation for pure financial 
loss is not given. The paper first analyses the social value of an audit. Then several liability rules 
with precise and vague levels of professional care are treated with respect to their incentive effects. 
This leads to the proposal of a rule of gross negligence in tort law. In the last part we analyse the 
special conditions, under which the legal order should assume a contract with protective 
consequences for buyers of company shares, which leads to liability for simple negligence. The 
legal form of a contract with protective consequences for third parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
für Dritte) is borrowed from German dogmatic scholarship, but may be interesting in this respect 
for an international audience as well.  
This article draws from the literature on pure financial losses
2 and from the literature on precise and 
vague negligence norms
3 as well as from the literature on the tort contract boundary
4. The article 
1 For surveys on the compensation of pure economic loss in tort see E. Banakas, Civil Liability for Pure Economic 
Loss, Kluver Law International, London et al. ,1996
2 F. Parisi, Liability for Pure Financial Loss: Revisiting the Economic Foundations of a Legal Doctrine, George Mason 
University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper, 2001, 01-21;  E. Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for 
Pure Economic Loss, 32 University of Michigan Law Review, (1999) pp. 404;  E. Banakas (ed.) Civil Liability for Pure 
Financial Loss, Kluwer Law International, London.The Hague-Boston, (1996), W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 
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does however not discuss the problem of joint and several liability and the strategic problems 
involved, which have been broadly discussed in the literature. The victim of a wrong audit might 
have a claim against the inside investor, the management, the firm and/or the auditor. This causes 
strategic interactions, which influence the level of care of all actors as well as the price of auditing
5. 
These problems have been extensively dealt with in the literature and are left out here completely. 
The focus is exclusively on the question, under which conditions the victim should be highly 
protected by contract law or get a lower level of protection under tort law.
B. The optimal level of care of an auditor
 The problem of auditors´ liability arises, given that the auditor certifies a financial report such as a 
balance sheet of a company. 
First, the auditor might cause damage to his contractual partner, the company and the company 
claims damages. The base of this claim is the contract with the auditor. 
Second, the auditor testifies a financial report and a balance sheet, which inside owners use for 
preparing a transaction, when they sell the company or shares to new owners or if a firm goes 
public in an initial public offering. By the auditors’ overvaluation of the corporation, the buyer 
suffers a loss. Here typically asymmetric information between buyer and seller of the firm exists. 
The audit is made to reduce this asymmetry.
Third, the auditor certifies a balance sheet, in which the net worth of the company is overvalued. 
This leads to an overvaluation of shares at the stock market until the bad company news reaches the 
market by other channels of information. Therefore, outside shareholders suffer losses. Here 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers typically do not exist.
We concentrate on the second and the third constellation, when the victims of such losses have no 
direct and explicit contractual relation with the auditor. The question then arises, whether the 
victims should be protected by the contract between the auditor and the management of the firm or 
whether they should be restricted to a tort claim. We argue that liability in the second case should 
be stricter than in the third case. The rationale for this is found in the literature on pure economic 
loss in torts. The basic argument is that pure economic losses contain a redistributive component. 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1982)  1-29.V. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort following the 
Exxon Valdes Oil Spill, 23 Journal of Legal Studies (1991) pp.; M. Rizzo, A Theory of the Economic Loss Problem in 
the Law of Torts, 11 Journal of Legal Studies, 1982, 249-275
3 see R. Crasswell and J.E. Calfee, Deterrence and uncertain Legal Standards”, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organisation, Vol.2 no.2 1986, pp.281; see also R. Schwartz, Auditors’ Liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing 
Standards, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 11 (1998); 183-207, and Ralf Ewert, Auditor Liability and 
the Precision of Auditing Standards, op. cit. Fn. 1.
4 P.H. Rubin, torts and the Tort-Contract boundary in Product Liability, in F. Buckley (ed.), the Fall and Rise of 
Freedom of Contract,  Duke University Press, 1999, Victor P. Goldberg, "A Reexamination of 'Glanzer v. Shepard': 
Surveyors on the Tort-Contract Boundary", Vol. 3, Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Online Edition): No. 2, Article 6 
(2002). http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol3/iss2/art6
5 For a review of  the strategic literature on accounting see R. Ewert,  Auditor Liability and the Precision of Auditing 
Standards, JITE (1999), Vol.155, pp. 181-206. See also S.A. Hillegeist, Financial Reporting and Auditing Under 
Alternative Damage Apportionment Rules, The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 347-369; Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, 
Zhaoyang Gu, Low Balling Legal Liability and Auditor Independence, The Accounting Review, Vol. 73, No. 4 1998, 
pp. 533-555., R.R. King, R. Schwartz, An Experimental Investigation of Auditors’ Liability: Implications for Social 
Welfare and Exploration of Deviations from Theoretical Predictions, The Accounting Review, Vol. 95, 2000, pp. 429-
451. 
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Therefore, the victims’ loss is lower than the total societal loss, which might lead to 
overcompensation and overdeterrence of victims. The main purpose of this article is to show why 
this argument holds for the third, but not for the second constellation. 
We first analyze the case in which the auditor´s mistake leads to an overvaluation of shares at the 
stock market such that shareholders might suffer losses, a case which in recent years and months 
has occurred in many countries. As usual in the law and economics literature the legal remedies are 
analyzed from a viewpoint of optimal deterrence. We first analyze the auditors’ liability to 
shareholders and then proceed to the special case, in which the auditors’ expertise is exclusively 
used for preparing the transfer of ownership from an inside to an outside investor and in which the 
buyers suffer a loss because the assets were overvalued. Throughout the article we assume that 
auditors as well as shareholders are risk neutral and maximize expected income. 
I. The case of an information efficient capital market, the true yield parameter is known for 
every period
We begin the analysis with determining the efficient level of care of an auditor or in other words 
the efficient level of costs (x=x*) for auditing a company´s report or balance sheet. Thereafter it is 
asked, which liability regime and which scope of liability provides incentives to reach this level. 
We analyze a stock listed company, in which one share represents one unit of capital. Let the net 
yield per period per share and per unit of capital be a and let the opportunity cost interest rate of 
capital be r. Then the net profit per period is a-r.
The yield (a) is regarded as a parameter whose value might be either high or low. For simplicity’s
sake the parameter can have only two possible values, which are common knowledge to 
shareholders, management and auditors. Depending on the conditions of the market as well as on 
technical productivity the parameter can take either a high or a low value in each period. 
} { h l a , a a￿
If the capital market is information efficient in the strong sense the true parameter is known to the 
market and reflected in the market price. The market price is the discounted value of all future yield 
parameters. Consequently auditing cannot improve any decisions of shareholders or the 
management. Therefore mandatory auditing of annual reports, balance sheets and cash flow 
calculation is a mere waste as it creates additional costs to the shareholders without causing any 
benefits. Information efficient stock markets do not need mandatory auditing. Neither is there a 
rationale for any liability vis-à-vis stockholders, because by assumption auditors cannot cause 
losses to shareholders, regardless of the auditor´s level of care.
II. The yield parameter is known only for the first period
To relax informational assumptions assume that the exact value of the yield parameter for the first 
period is common knowledge at the beginning of the first period. But for all future periods the 
parameter is not known and cannot be revealed, neither by the management nor by anybody else. 
There exists only a probability distribution. In other words, one knows the near future with 
certainty, whereas the distant future is uncertain.
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In this case the price of one share (p) in period 1 is
p=ah+R
if the yield parameter is high during the first period. R is a constant term, which reflects the 
discounted value of expected earnings in the periods 2 to infinity. If the yield parameter is low in 
the first period, two possibilities arise. First, al>r. In that case the price for the share is
p=al+R
Second, if  ra l < , shareholders are interested that the management shifts the capital to alternative 
uses outside the firm such that the yield is r. This asset shifting should be repeated in any future 
period, whenever a=al<r. This also includes the possibility of permanent liquidation of the firm, if 
r>R. This shifting requires that capital is not firm specific and can be transferred without a cost to 
productive uses outside the firm. Throughout this article we assume that this is possible, because 
the basic argument still holds if only fractions of the capital can be put to a different use outside the 
firm as a reaction to low yield within the firm. 
Therefore, if the management acts in the shareholders interest, if the capital market is information 
efficient and if the parameter (a) is low an immediate reallocation of resources takes place. This
generates a yield of  l a r ￿ , compared to the situation, in which the capital stock is used inside the 
firm. The auditor can neither promote nor prevent this yield. 
III. The Yield Parameter is Not Known. 
We now analyze a situation, in which the yield parameter for a particular period is uncertain at the 
beginning of the period, but reveals itself at no cost at the end of  the period. The expected yield for 
any period is now the sum of the yield parameters, weighted with probabilities. Let the probabilities 
that the yield parameters are low and high in the first period be w and (1-w). The expected yield 
(ey) for the first period is then.
h l a ) w 1 ( wa a ) 1 ( ￿ + =
For the second and all other periods we again add the constant term R to get the share price. The 
share price at the beginning of the first period is then
(2)                      Ra ) w 1 ( wa p h l + ￿ + =
The uncertainty reflected in this equation can have two reasons. Either nobody, neither 
shareholders nor management, know the true parameter or the management knows the true 
parameter, but conceals it successfully from the shareholders. The management might for instance 
know that the company just “burns money”, and needs restructuring or even liquidation (a=al )
including dismissal of the management, but keeps this as a secret by fabricating positive news. 
Paradigmatic for such management behavior are the Holzmann bankruptcy
6 in Germany or the 
Enron scandal
7 in the USA. In both cases the management misinformed shareholders and was –for 
some time- able to keep share values up. In this case capital is used inside the firm even if –at the 
6 Business Week online, January 28, 2002
7 Welt am Sonntag, August 28,  2003
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end of the period- it is revealed to shareholders that the yield parameter is low and that a loss of 
l a r ￿ was caused which could have been avoided.
If the management knows the true value of the parameter at the beginning of the period and is loyal 
to shareholders, it will shift resources to uses outside the firm. If shareholders know this the share
price will –by the amount of w(r-al)- be higher than in equation (2). Equation (2) therefore
presupposes that either the true parameter is not known to the management or that it is known to the 
management but not to the shareholders and that the management acts disloyal to shareholders by 
neither informing them and nor shifting resources to uses outside the firm and continues “burning 
of money”.
Under these assumptions the screening by an auditor can lead to a socially valuable information
8.
Auditors often have a broader knowledge than managers about the general conditions of the 
market. They might for instance. see that a patent is valueless even though it is not yet expired or 
that housing prices in East Germany are likely to be depressed for a longer period, or that some of 
the main debtors of the company are close to bankruptcy etc. . Or they can just see and make public 
what an disloyal management tries to conceal from the shareholders. In these cases their work can 
help to avoid further unproductive investment and losses.
We assume now that the auditor acts at the beginning of a period, that his effort might lead to a 
revelation of the true parameter for this period, and if so that this forces the management to stop 
losses by shifting resources to alternative use. Throughout this article we use the following 
sequence of actions and events.
1. At the beginning of the period the productivity parameter is unknown to shareholders. 
2. The audit is made. The auditor either finds or does not find the true productivity parameter. The 
audit is published for the use of outside investors. 
3. If the auditor finds that the true parameter is low (a=al), this leads the management to shift           
resources to uses outside the firm. 
4. If the audit does not reveal the true parameter, it reveals itself to the shareholders without cost at 
the end of the period.
The events 1.,2.,3. are all at the beginning of the period, the event 4. is at the end of the period. The 
company receives the yield (ah,al or r).
To keep the analysis simple it is assumed, that the auditors effort cannot reveal the yield parameters
for any future period t>1. The value of the firm per share is therefore always the expected yield of 
the first period, which is partly dependent on the auditors’ effort plus a fixed term R as the 
discounted net income of all other periods. 
We can now calculate the optimal effort level, which is set equal to the optimal cost level (x) of the 
auditor. The search costs of the auditor are x (per share). If inspite of his search the auditor does not 
find the true parameter value these costs are born by the shareholder and consequently the price of 
the share is reduced to.
R x a R x a ) w 1 ( wa p ) 3 ( h l + ￿ = + ￿ ￿ + =
8 A socially productive information allows for an improvement of resource allocation, whereas a socially unprod
uctive information does not have this capacity. A socially unproductive information can still be privately valuable, if it 
leads to a foreknowledge which can be used for a  mere transfer of wealth, without improving the allocation of 
resources.  See J. Hirschleifer,     
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If the auditor finds the true value of the parameter three constellations can arise. The true value is 
high and immediately publicized, then the share price increases
9 to
R x a p ) 4 ( h + ￿ =
The auditor finds that the parameter is low. If it is low but still higher than r, the opportunity cost of 
capital, the share price reduces to
R x a p ) 5 ( l + ￿ =
In this case the auditor has revealed the true value of the firm and found that it is lower than 
expected. But this does not lead to any improved allocation of resources. For a buyer of a company 
or a buyer of shares this might be a very profitable information. But socially this information is not 
productive as it does not lead to an efficiency gain. 
If the auditor finds that the parameter is low and lower than r, an immediate reallocation of 
resources takes place to uses outside the firm. The future “burning of money” is prevented by the 
activity of the auditor. In that case the value of the firm is
R x - r p ) 6 ( + =
In this case the auditor´s work leads to a net efficiency gain of (r-al)-x. 
We can now calculate the optimal costs of the auditor´s effort. We assume that the probability that 
the auditor´s search leads to the revelation of the true parameter is q=q(x). Consequently the 
probability that the true parameter is not found is 1-q(x). This function has the following properties: 
q=0 if x=0,  ] 1 , 0 ( q￿  if x>0, qx(x)>0 qxx(x)<0, and  ￿ ￿ ￿  x if , 1 q
10. 
We now analyze the case in which the auditor´s effort can lead to an efficiency gain, that is the case 
in which the low yield parameter is lower than the opportunity costs of capital  r al < .
The expected efficiency gain (eg) of the auditor´s work is then the probability that the true 
parameter is detected multiplied with the prior probability that this parameter is low and below the 
opportunity costs of capital (r) in the first period multiplied with the efficiency gain that is made 
possible in this case minus the costs of auditing.
x ) a r ( w ) x ( q eg ) 7 ( l ￿ ￿ =
For the first order condition we get  01 ) a r ( w ) x ( q l x = ￿ ￿  or  
9 It increases only if the costs of auditing are relatively small compared to the price increase due to the revelation the 
fact that the true parameter is high.







tan q  .
) a r ( w
1
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This is the Learned Hand formula for the optimal search costs of the auditor. It determines a unique
optimal level of costs (x*). Consequently the auditor acts negligently as long as his costs are below 
this level.  
The expected social loss (SL) of negligent behavior of the auditor is then the difference between the 
social gain of auditing if the effort level (x) is optimal minus the social gain if it is not optimal. 
(9)       [ ] ) x * x ( ) a r ( w ) x ( q *) x ( q SL l ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
C. Consequences of liability rules
We can now analyze different tort liability rules which give the shareholder a claim against the 
negligent auditor. The following rules are analyzed. 
(1) Full liability and partial liability (on the European continent better known as difference 
principle or “Differenzprinzip”) under negligence, if the level of due care is precisely defined. It is 
shown that these rules lead to overcompensation of shareholders, but not to overdeterrence.
(2) Liability under negligence, if the level of due care is not precisely defined and the auditor 
knows only a probability distribution of the due level of care. It is shown that this rule leads to 
overcompensation and to overdeterrence if overcompensation is sufficiently high.
(3) Full liability under gross negligence or under an obvious violation of professional standards. It 
is shown, that this rule leads to overcompensation, but that the problems of overdeterrence are 
reduced under this rule. 
I. Full liability under negligence, if the level of care is precisely defined
1. The cost minimizing auditor
This rule gives every shareholder who suffers the loss (p-al) at the end of the period a tort claim
against the negligent auditor, who failed to detect the true value of the yield parameter at the 
beginning of the period. We assume that courts fix a due level of care which is equal to the efficient 
level of care. Negligence is then defined by the condition x<x*.  
Under this rule the total costs of the auditor are TC, the expected liability costs are l and the costs 







* x x if x
* x x if x l
TC
Obviously the auditor does not choose an  * x x > .
We now show that whenever he makes a choice in the range  [ ] * x , 0 x￿  he also must choose x* as 
his private cost minimum, because whenever he reduces x by some arbitrary amount below x* to 
save costs, the resulting expected damage compensation must be higher than the costs saved.
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x* is the cost, which minimizes the sum total of x and q(x)w(r-al), the expected social gain from 
auditing. Therefore any reduction of x below the value of x* leads to an increase of this sum that is 
to a social loss. The expected social loss (SL) from reaching a cost level below x* is then 
[ ] [ ] ) x * x ( ) a r ( w ) x ( q *) x ( q x ) a r ( w ) x ( q * x ) a r ( w *) x ( q SL ) 10 ( l l l ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
We show that the private loss from choosing an x<x* is larger than the social loss for every x. That 
is a sufficient condition for the liability rule to give incentives to reach x*. 
In the case of full liability the shareholder receives a damage compensation which is the difference 
between the price at the beginning of the period (p)  and the price at the end of the period al, that is 
(p-al).
If the auditor acts negligently (x<x*) and still finds the true value of the parameter with probability 
q(x), he will –in spite of his negligence- not cause any loss. This excludes liability. The expected 
liability costs plus auditing costs (TC) of the auditor are then for any x<x*.
(11) [ ] [ ] ) a a ( w ) x ( q 1 x ) R a ( p ( w ) x ( q 1 TC l l ￿ ￿ = + + ￿ ￿ =
The term (1-q(x) denotes the probability that the auditor does not find the true value of the 
parameter with a cost level of x. The expected private losses for the auditor (PL) of reducing the 
care level below the efficient level by the amount of x*-x are the total costs at the care level x<x* 
minus the efficient costs of auditing, which if spent would exclude liability.
(12)                     [ ] [ ] ) x * x ( a a w ) x ( q 1 PL l ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
Also, x<x*. Here the term x*-x denotes the reduction of auditing costs from the efficient level to a 
level below the efficient level and the other term denotes the resulting expected liability. If one 
compares these private losses with the social losses from deviating from the optimal effort level 
one sees that these private losses are greater for any cost reduction below the level of x*. The 
reason is that we assumed that  r a >  and  that (1-q(x))>(q(x*)-q(x)) (Compare the expected private 
loss in (12) with the expression for the expected social loss in (9)). Therefore the private loss for 
the auditor from choosing a cost level x which is below the efficient cost level x* is bigger than the 
social loss. Consequently the private cost minimum is x* . The ratio of private loss to social loss of 
not reaching the optimal and due level of care is bigger than 1.
(13)                      [ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
1
) x * x ( a r w ) x ( q *) x ( q





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿
=
Shareholders are overcompensated under this rule as is often the case with “pure economic loss” in 
which damage compensation is larger than losses inflicted to the society. The quota of 
overcompensation is given by the term [ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
1
a r w ) x ( q *) x ( q





The private losses of the auditor from reducing costs to a level below x* are therefore higher than 
the social losses for any level of x. As social losses of reducing the effort level below the optimal 
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level (x*)  are higher than the cost reductions (x*-x), this proves that any cost reduction to a level 
below x* increases total private costs, i.e. auditing costs plus liability costs for the auditor. And the 
auditor has an incentive to reach the optimal effort level. Therefore, even though damage 
compensation  l a a ￿  is higher than the total social damages (r-al) in case a damage occurs, this does 
not lead to overdeterrence as long as the level of due care is precisely defined and efficient.
2. The share price if shareholders know the consequences of the liability rule 
We can now also calculate the share price at the beginning of the period before the auditor gives his 
audit. If liability has the above properties, the shareholders will assume that auditors work 
efficiently and that they can prevent unnecessary losses in case the yield parameter is low. They 
also foresee that liability is just a threat and will not actually happen and that therefore the expected 
liability costs will be zero. The ex ante price (p), given the liability rule is then
(14)                     [ ] R * x a ) w 1 ( wa *)) x ( q 1 ( ) a ) w 1 ( wr *)( x ( q p h l h + ￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + =
This price is higher than the price with which we worked above, by assuming that the shareholders 
believe that the work of auditors is useless for them. Consequently in case of a liability also the 
damage award (p-al) is higher. Therefore the fact, that this rule leads to overcompensation and 
efficient incentives also prevails for the price in (13). 
II. Partial liability under negligence, if the level of care is precisely defined
1. The difference principle
Under partial liability the damage award is the difference between the wealth of the victim with and 
without the negligent act. This rule, known in Continental Europe as the difference principle,
(Differenzprinzip in German, § 249 BGB) would not lead to a full compensation (p-al ) of the 
shareholder by the auditor. To clarify this principle with respect to auditor´s liability we have to 
distinguish between three different cases.
(1) The buyer buys the shares before the beginning of period 1 and still keeps them after the end of 
period 1. The auditor fails negligently to discover and publish the low yield parameter at the 
beginning of period 1. At the end of period 1 the market reveals that the parameter is low (al). The 
buyer suffers a loss of p-al+R= l a a ￿  Under the difference principle the shareholder would however 
not be entitled to recover this loss. The defendant could argue that if he had been diligent and 
exercised due care and informed the public properly at the beginning of the period, the value of the 
shares would have dropped from p to r+R and that he has caused only the damage r-al. This resulted 
from the fact that the auditors did not cause the management to shift resources to uses outside the 
firm where they could yield the opportunity costs of capital. To my knowledge this defense 
according to the difference principle would be accepted in most legal orders. Damage 
compensation in this case would therefore result not in full liability (p-al+R), but in partial liability
(r+R-al+R=r-ar). 
 
It is also noteworthy that in general the difference principle applies only, if the defendant shows 
that even without negligent behavior a certain damage would have occurred with certainty. The 
difference principle is however not applicable with respect to probabilities. If the defendant has 
reached a cost level of auditing of x<x* he cannot argue that even if he had reached the due level of 
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care (x*), the same damage might have occurred but with a lower probability. And he cannot argue 
that therefore the damage award should therefore be reduced to the damage (r-al) multiplied with 
the probability differential of the damage probability with and without the due level of care. At 
least this defense seems not to be possible within Germany, where the difference principle is part of 
the Civil Code and generally accepted by jurisdiction
11. We will therefore interpret partial liability 
based on the difference principle as a rule which reduces liability if a full proof can be given that 
some of the damages would have occurred anyway, even if the defendant had reached the due level 
of care. 
This means that –if the shareholder has bought the shares before period 1 and still holds them after 
the end of that period- the total costs of the auditor under this rule will be
￿
￿
￿ < + ￿ ￿
=
. otherwise x
* x x if x ) a r ( w )) x ( q 1 (
TC
l
In that case the total private costs of the auditor of deviating from the efficient level of care is the
sum of auditing and liability costs if x<x* minus the costs leading to the efficient level of auditing
x*.
(15)                     )x * x ( ) a r ( w )) x ( q 1 ( PL l ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
Is there overdeterrence in this case as under a rule of full liability? The shareholder receives a 
compensation equal to the social damage of r-al. The auditor cannot reduce his total costs by 
reducing his costs of care below the due level of care. This is due to the fact, that in case damage is 
paid, compensation is equal to the social loss. But the fact that the auditor cannot argue that the 
damage might have occurred even in the case of due diligence, however with a lower probability 
still makes the expected private loss of deviating from the optimal cost level of care larger than the 
expected social loss for every level of care x<x*(compare (15) with (9)).
(2)The buyer buys the shares after the beginning of period 1and keeps them until after the end of 
period 1.
In this case the buyer buys at price p in period 1. The auditor failed to find and make public that the 
yield parameter is low. The buyer keeps the share until after the true parameter is revealed to the 
market at the end of period 1 and suffers a loss of p-(al+R)= l a a ￿ . Now the use of partial liability 
under the difference principle does not lead to any reduction of the damage award. Had the auditor 
not acted negligently and had he found the true parameter, the drop in share prices by (p-(r+R)) 
would have happened before the buy. Therefore, the defendant cannot argue that if he had acted 
diligently the plaintiff would have suffered a loss of (p-(r+R)) anyway which would reduce the 
damage award to (r-al). The difference principle leads to full liability and therefore –from a social 
point of view- to overcompensation. The total expected costs given that the shareholder bought the 
shares after the beginning of period 1 is then
11 In the case of Landwehrkanal in Berlin the German Supreme Court BGH held the state of Berlin liable for not 
cleaning the Landwehrkanal, an inner city canal, more than once in a year. The failure to reach a higher level of care 
led to full compensation of a shipowner whose ship propeller was damaged by floating filth. The fact that with more 
frequent cleaning the same damage might have ocurred but with a lower probability did not lead to any reduction of the 
damage award.  (BGHZ, Landwehrkanal…..).
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(16)                     [ ]
￿
￿
￿ < + + ￿ ￿
=
. otherwise x
* x x if , x ) R a a ( w ) x ( q 1
TC
l
(3)the buyer sells the share after the beginning and before the end of period 1.
Here the buyer sells shares at an overvalued price, because the auditor has failed to detect and 
publicize that the company is worth less than the market valuation. This resembles the case of an 
art collector who buys a painting at a high price, which is based on the expertise of an art expert, 
who negligently overlooked that the painting was a fake. The art collector resells the painting at a 
high price and only the second buyer discovers the fake and suffers the loss. To this shareholder the 
negligence of the auditor has caused a gain of  r a ￿  under the difference principle. Had the auditor 
not negligently failed to detect the true parameter, the shareholder would have suffered an 
equivalent loss.  As this loss was avoided, the auditor has caused a gain to the shareholder. From an 
economic policy point of view this gain should be disgorged to the auditor according to the 
mitigation principle. But this is a practical impossibility. Therefore under the difference principle 
the private gains caused by the negligent behavior of the auditor are not disgorged, but the private 
losses of those who buy the shares within period 1 have to be fully compensated, which again leads 
to overcompensation. 
2. Total expected damage compensation under the difference principle 
We can now calculate the expected damage compensation under the difference principle. For this 
we assume that every shareholder who holds shares after period 1 has a constant probability of 
having bought the shares in period 1 ) (￿ or before period 1 ) 1 ( ￿ ￿ .
The expected total cost for the tortfeasor (TC), damage compensation plus costs of auditing (x) is 
then
(17)                     [ ] [ ] * x  x if < + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ = x ) a r ( w )) x ( q 1 ( ) 1 ( ) a a ( w )) x ( q 1 ( TC l l
The expected private loss of the tortfeasor (PL) of reaching a cost level below the efficient cost 
level is then TC-x* or 
(18)                     [ ] [ ]
[] [] ) x * x ( ) a r )( 1 ( ) a a ( w ) x ( q 1 PL
) x * x ( ) a r ( w )) x ( q 1 ( ) 1 ( ) a a ( w )) x ( q 1 ( PL
l l
l l
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ =
The ratio Q between the private and the Social loss is then
(19) [ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
1
) x * x ( a r w ) x ( q *) x ( q
) x * x ( ) a r )( 1 ( ) a a ( w ) x ( q 1
SL
PL
) x ( Q
l
l l >
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
= =
It can easily be seen that this ratio is also larger than one as long as  l a a > and that the private costs 
of  the auditor of deviating from the efficient cost level x* are larger than the social losses caused 
by this deviation. Thus overcompensation is inevitable even under partial liability. However, as 
only the social loss is compensated, if the shareholder has bought his shares before period 1, the 
distance from social losses to auditor´s private losses is smaller than under full liability.
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It is also easy to see that overcompensation does not lead to overdeterrence under partial liability, if 
the due costs of care are precisely defined at x*. For the same reasons as explained under full 
liability the cost minimum must be the efficient and due level of care. 
III. Overcompensation and overdeterrence under negligence, if the due level of care is 
unknown ex-ante
In this section we analyze the effect of overcompensation on deterrence if the due level of care is 
not precisely known ex ante, neither to courts nor to tortfeasors
12. Only during the judicial 
procedure, when the parties present the facts of the case and when the tortfeasor explains what he 
has done to reduce damages and when the plaintiff explains what could have been done the due 
level of care is fixed ex post. This is a realistic assumption for most of the cases. An ex ante precise 
level of care is to be found more often in regulatory law where experts can fix it beyond legal 
procedure. It is also to be found in those tort areas, in which a long accummulation of high court 
decisions has led to a precise rule. However in dynamic fields with changing technologies this is 
not to be expected and the due level of care is most likely known only as a probability distribution  
when the tortfeasor decides on his level of care. We change assumptions as explained by the 
following graph.
Here x is the cost of care. xl  denotes a lower threshold level of care for which negligence can be 
regarded as being obvious for an outside observer like a judge. If  l x x ￿ and a damage is caused, 
courts will assume negligence and liability results with certainty. If  h x x ￿ it is equally obvious that 
the due level of care was reached and courts will always accept this level or a higher level as 
sufficient to exclude liability. It is assumed that tortfeasors know these threshold levels defined by 
the courts and therefore know all levels of care which exclude liability with certainty and all levels 
of care which will lead to liability with certainty. 
Between xl and xh the tortfeasor attaches a probability that he is held negligent to each possible care 
level. Denote this probability value with F=F(x). F has the following properties.
12 For an analytical exposition without bounds for the range of the distribution function F. see R. Crasswell and J.E. 
Calfee, Deterrence and uncertain Legal Standards”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, Vol.2 no.2 1986, 
pp.281, See also R. Schwartz, Auditors’ Liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing Standards, Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 11 (1998); 183-207, and Ralf Ewert, Auditor Liability and the Precision of Auditing 
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To be able to analyze the effect of overcompensation, we assume that damage compensation is by a 
factor m (m>1) higher than the social damages for all levels of x<xh. In equation (13) and (19) this 
ratio is shown for  full and partial liability under the difference principle. From this equations it also 
follows that m can change with x, but that it is always larger than 1. However to avoid more 
complicated terms it is further assumed that m is a parameter (m>1).
We make the further assumption, that the efficient level of care (x*) is between xl and xh. This is 
the most plausible assumption, if one assumes that the courts try to hit the efficient level of care 
when they fix the due level of care but for lack of information sometimes hit to the right and 
sometimes to the left of x*. The tortfeasor minimizes his expected costs.
Assume that  l x x 0 ￿ ￿ . Then his costs are mD+x, where D reflects the damage compensation. In 
this range at every x an increase of x must decrease total costs, as by assumption the level of care is 
then smaller than the optimal level and any  x ￿ leads to a higher reduction in damages  D ￿ and an 
even higher reduction in damage compensation D m￿ , as m>1. The cost minimum in this range is 
therefore at xl. Assume now that x is increased by a small value at xl , then again total costs must 
decrease, as by assumption the level of care is then still lower than the optimal level and the 
resulting reduction in damage compensation D m￿  is higher than the increase in x at xl. Furthermore 
also the probability of being negligent decreases below 1 which leads to a further reduction of the 
expected damage compensation. Consequently xl cannot be a cost minimum. If there exists a cost 
minimum it must be at a higher level of x than xl. If  h x x ￿ total costs of the tortfeasor are x, as it is 
certain that the due level of care is reached. Consequently the cost minimum in this range is xh. The 
cost minimum for all values of x must therefore be at at a level higher than xl , and the highest 
possible cost minimum is xh .
In the range  h l x x x ￿ < total expected costs of the tortfeasor (TC) are
x ) x ( mD ) x ( F TC + = . Differentiation with respect to x yields the first order condition
[ ] 0 1 ) x ( F ) x ( D ) x ( D ) x ( F m TC x x x = + + = ,  with .0 ) x ( F , 0 ) x ( D , 0 D , 0 F x x > > < <
It is now easy to see that only by chance the tortfeasor gets incentives to reach the efficient level of  
of care, if
(21)                    
m
1
*) x ( F *) x ( D *) x ( D *) x ( F x x ￿ = +
This depends on whether at x* the joint effect of an increase of the costs of care on the probability 
of liability and on the damages just outweighs this increase. Otherwise the cost minimum is reached 
at some level of  * x x ￿ in the interior of the range or at x=xh. The result is therefore either over- or 
undertederrence, if the standard of due care is known only as a probability distribution.
It is also easy to see that with an m high enough the value of 1/m must be higher than the value of 
the left hand side. That means that the equality can only be reached at a an x>x* and that therefore 
overdeterrence results.
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Proposition 1. If the level of due care is imprecise ex ante within a range and if the efficient level 
of care is within this range, there exists an m>1 for which overcompensation in a negligence regime 
must result in overdeterrence. The same results for any number bigger than m.
Overdeterrence of auditors is therefore a likely outcome under a rule of simple negligence, if 
-the purely redistributive component of liability is high enough and 
-it is not possible to define ex ante clear and efficient rules of behaviour whose observation lead to 
an  escape  from  liability  and  whose  violation  triggers  liability  with  certainty.  It  is  however 
questionable  whether  a  complex  task  as  auditing,  which  includes  among  other  things  asset 
valuation,  can  be  efficiently prescribed by clear rules of behaviour and due care. However the 
problem of overdeterrence might still be solved or at least alleviated by a negligence concept of 
gross negligence.
C. Gross Negligence as a method to reduce overdeterrence.
For a solution or at least alleviation to this problem we present a concept of “gross negligence” or 
“gross  violation  of  professional  standards”,  that  should  trigger  liability  instead  of  normal 
negligence. To do this we have first to take a closer look at the distribution function F(x). This 
function is defined over the interval [ ] h l x , x.    Its value is 1 at the lower bound and 0 at the upper
bound of this interval. The legal interpretation of the upper bound is that at these costs of care it is 
obvious that the tortfeasor was not negligent. The legal interpretation of the lower bound is that it is 
obvious that the tortfeasor was negligent. F(x) is continuous and Fx(x)<0, ) 1 , 0 ( ) x ( F ￿  everywhere 
in the interior of the interval. Now assume that the legal system imposes a restriction on the court 
decision. This restriction is a rule which fixes an upper bound xg which is strictly smaller than xh.
Liability is then excluded with certainty, if xg<xh is reached, even if it is not obvious that the 
tortfeasor was not negligent.
With an xg <xh we now get a new distribution function whose value is 1 at x=xl and whose value is 
0 at x=xg<xh. Let this function be G (x) and let it also be of the same type as F(x). Then we assume 
as a consequence:
(22)                     ) x ( F ) x ( G < if  ( ] g l l x , x , x ( x￿
(23)                     ) x ( F ) x ( G x x < if  ] g l x , x ( x￿ .
This is illustrated by the following graph in whgich G and F are linear functions
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Here the absolute values of G(x)  and of Gx(x) are strictly smaller than the values of F(x) and Fx(x)  
for  any  [ ] g l x , x x￿   We  believe  that  this  is  a  reasonable  consequence  also  for  other  types  of 
functions with the properties of G(x) and F(x) given as in (21) and (22). 
The  function  G(x)  is  interpreted  as  a  definition  of  gross  negligence.  Under  this  definition  the 
tortfeasor is liable in damages if it is obvious that his level of care was too low. But he can escape 
liability at a relatively low level of care at which it is not obvious that he was not negligent.
We now ask, whether it is possible to find an xg and thereby define a range of gross negligence, 
which leads to efficient incentives for the tortfeasor, even in the case of overcompensation. For this 
purpose we now regard xg as a variable, which can run from xl to xh .This leads to a distribution 
function with the following properties.
(24)                    
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The total cost function for the tortfeasor in the range between xl and xg is then
(25)                     x ) x ( mD ) x , x ( G TC g + =
For the first order conditions one gets
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It is now possible to ask for the socially optimal upper bound xg* of the distribution function G(x).
We ask which xg minimizes the total expected costs of the tortfeasor, given an optimal level of care 
(x=x*).
(27)                     []
m
1
) x *, x ( G *) x ( D *) x ( D ) x *, x ( G TC g x g x x ￿ = + =
This yields an xg=xg*. Proof: Assume as a starting point that m and xg are high enough to lead to an 
overdeterrence at xg i.e. []
m
1
) x *, x ( G *) x ( D *) x ( D ) x *, x ( G TC g x g x x ￿ > + = . Now reduce the value 
of xg continuously towards xl. That reduces the values of G>0 and of Gxg <0. Gxg must decrease 
below all limits, as Gxg ￿-￿ if xg l x ￿ . This results because the value of G drops from 1 at G(xl) 
to 0 at G(xg). Consequently the first derivative of the function within this range, which is always 
negative  must  decrease  below  all  limits.  The  range  of  the  function  then  becomes  smaller  and 
approaches 0. The value of the function must always run from 1 to zero within this range, however 
small the range is. This must decrease the value of the derivative below all limits. 




) x *, x ( G *) x ( D *) x ( D ) x *, x ( G g x g x ￿ = + . Assume now that the legal system chooses the range 
[ ] * x , x g l  over which the distribution function is defined. Then the tortfeasor minimizes his total 
costs when he chooses a care level which is equal to the socially optimal care level.
Proposition 2: Assume overcompensation for pure financial loss leads to overdeterrence under a 
level of due care which is known ex ante only as a distribution function F(x) with a lower and an 
upper bound for the range of the function. Then there exists another distribution function G(x) with 
the same lower bound and a smaller upper bound of its range, which induces the optimal level of 
care.
Such a distribution function can be called “Gross Negligence” or in the case of auditors “Gross 
Violation  of  Professional  Standards”.  If  courts  stick  to  such  a  standard,  when  granting 
compensation  for  pure  financial  losses,  it  is  guaranteed  that  overcompensation  does  not 
systematically lead to overdeterrence. 
Of course the informational requirements for such a gross negligence standard can often not be met 
by the courts. If a concept of gross violation of standards is used, it might be to lax i.e. xg too close 
to xl (the level of obvious negligence) and then even lead to underdeterrence. Or it might be too 
close to simple negligence, i.e. xg too close to xh , leading still to overdeterrence just as under a 
normal legligence standard. How often this happens, is dependent on the informational level of 
courts  and  cannot  be  analysed  here. But  the  systematic  bias  of  overdeterrence  as  a  result  of 
overcompensation disappears, if the above concept of gross negligence is introduced. 
In this context it is noteworthy that the German supreme court (BGH) has in various decisions on 
the liability of experts for pure financial damages used a standard of gross negligence to trigger tort 
liability. Basically the BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) restricts liability for pure financial loss in 
tort to those cases in which the tortfeasor acts intentionally (vorsätzlich) and under violation of boni 
mores  (Sittenwidrigkeit),  §  826  BGB.  This  very  restrictive  rule for  the  compensation  of  pure 
financial damages was somewhat relaxed by jurisdiction. In several court decisions the BGH ruled 
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that  gross  negligence  is  sufficient  for  the  court  to  assume  both  a  violation  of  boni  mores  and 
intentionality
13. This development was not accepted without critique within the legal profession
14.
It is seen as a deviation from the concept of intentionality for which the court in a civil law country 
lacks authority and as a silent introduction of gross negligence in a domain, which the legislator 
wanted in principle to exclude from liability. On the other hand it must be seen, that the very 
restrictive wording of § 826 BGB which practically excludes liability except for cases of proven 
disloyalty of the expert leads to efficiency losses. This loss is ever increasing over time as those 
professions which process and market information are becoming more and more important for the 
functioning of markets and especially the capital market. The jurisdiction of the supreme court 
should  therefore  be  welcomed  from  an  economic  perspective.  And  it  should  be  extended  and 
generally used in cases of auditor´s liability in tort.
D. The tort-contract boundary
Our analysis would be of little value if it were restricted to tort law. The claimant has always the 
possibility to base his claim either on tort law or on contract law or on both. This is especially the 
case in the German civil law system (Anspruchskonkurrenz). With respect to the compensation of 
pure financial losses the difference between tort and contract is of fundamental importance, as in 
contract the usual restrictions to compensate pure financial losses do not exist. If within a contract 
an expert such as an auditor negligently delivers a wrong expertise and thereby causes a damage to 
the partner he is liable for the pure financial loss
15. This is the general contractual default rule for 
consequential damages in Germany and in all major countries. 
If for instance an expert negligently overvalues a house in his expertise, which his contractual 
partner buys at a too high price, the expert is liable under contract law, even though he escapes 
liability under tort law. The fact that this has only led to a redistribution of wealth between the 
seller and the buyer of the house has no consequence in contract law. In a contract the partner has a 
willingness to pay the expert his costs of care x and his expected liability costs to such an extent 
that the sum total of his private damages from a wrong expertise and these costs are minimized. 
The contractual partner gets the liability he pays in the price of the expertise and his willingness to 
pay is related to the avoidance of private losses. Consequently, the problem of sorting out pure 
financial losses from compensation does in general not exist in contract law. The due level of care 
is  clearly  oriented  to  the  avoidance  of  private  losses  and  not  of  social  losses.  These  costs  are 
transactions costs which allow the transfer of resources to the highest valued user.
The  question  here  is,  whether  the  shareholder  has  a  contractual  claim  against the auditor. The 
auditor´s contract is not with the shareholders but with the corporation. An explicit contract does 
therefore not exist. This however does not exclude contractual liability, as all legal orders have 
developed concepts and routines that lead to a contractual claim under an implicit contract or a 
quasi-contract. It seems however that in Germany the scope of contractual liability is larger than in 
Common  Law  Countries.  In  Germany  the  concept  of  a  contract  whose  protective  effects  are 
extended to third parties exists on which a contractual claim can be based in such cases (Vertrag 
mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte). Some authors
16 have proposed a liability concept sui generis, based 
on simple negligence, for the liability of experts whose legal consequences can however be taken 
either  from  contract  law  or  from  tort  law.  There  exist  different  legal  forms  which  have  as  a 
consequence, that the claim can be based on contract law even if the claimant has no explicit 
13 BGH MW 1975, 559; BGH 1991, 3283=WM 1991, 2043 ff.
14 See C.-W..Canaris, Die Reichweite der Expertenhaftung gegenüber Dritten, ZHR, 163, (1999), 206 ff.
15 In Germany contractual liability of the auditor is capped. § 323, 2 HGB
16 See C.-W..Canaris, Die Reichweite der Expertenhaftung gegenüber Dritten, ZHR, 163, (1999), 206 ff.
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contract with the defendant. All these routines would lead to a compensation for pure financial loss 
under  negligence.  They  therefore  circumvent  the  restrictions  of  tort  law  with  regard  to  pure 
financial loss.
It is neither possible nor necessary to deal with these concepts in detail. They have all one in 
common, which is crucial from an economic perspective
17. They require that the protected person 
pays his protection in the price and that it can be assumed that he has a willingness to pay for his 
protection. 
With regard to shareholder liability it has already been shown, that the liability costs and the costs 
of care reduce the profits of the company and are therefore fully reflected in the value of a share. 
Therefore the shareholder alsway gets what he pays. This condition of quasi contractual liability is 
therefore given without any doubt. (See under B.)
The question is whether the shareholder is willing to pay for his protection and how much he would 
be ready to pay. Here it is now crucial to distinguish between shareholders in the secondary market 
and  buyers  of  shares  in  the  primary  market  or  in  initial  public  offerings.  For  both  groups  the 
willingness to pay for the protection is different. Therefore also the scope of liability should be 
different.
I. Shareholders willingness to pay for protection in the secondary market.
The typical shareholder is an investment fund or pension fund or a private person with a diversified 
portfolio. When he calculates his willingness to pay for the contractual liability and for the scope of 
his protection he is “behind a veil of ignorance”. There are three possibilities for him to occur (See 
above under B.II.1.).
(1) He has bought the shares before the audit, in which the company is overvalued. He still holds 
the shares after the bad news reached the stock market by other channels. The loss he suffered is 
therefore  r-al . His private loss is then equal to the social loss, which the auditor caused.
(2) He has bought the shares before the balance was published and sells them after the wrong audit 
but before the bad news reaches the market, that is in period 1. The auditor has caused him a profit 
of  r a ￿   by  his  negligence.  Had  the  auditor  avoided  the  mistake  the  share  prices  would  have 
dropped by this amount at a time when he was a holder of the share.
(3) He has bought the shares after the auditing took place (during period 1) and still keeps them, 
after the bad news reached the market anyway. Then he has suffered a loss of  l a a ￿
Let the probabilities for the outcomes (1), (2) and (3) be u1, u2 and u3. 
u1+u2+u3=1
Then we get for the expected loss of the shareholder (L), given a mistake of the auditor and given 
that the yield parameter is low:
L=u1(r-al)-u2(a- r )+u3(a- a l)
From section A III. we take, that the probability of a mistake of the auditor is (1-q(x)) and that the 
probability  that  this  will  result  in  a  damage  because  the  yield  parameter  is  low  is  (1-q(x)w).
17 H.B. Schäfer, Die Haftung für Wirtschaftsprüfer aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Perspective, AcP  2002 (202), 
808-840.
18 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2003,  Paper 21
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2003/iss1/art2119
Therefore, if not the corporation but the shareholders themselves would conclude the contract with 
the auditor, they would ask for a level of care, which minimizes the sum total of the expected 
shareholders  losses  plus  the costs  of auditing,  because  that would maximize their shareholders 
value.
[ ] x ) a a ( u ) r a ( u ) a r ( u w )) x ( q 1 ( Min l 3 2 l 1 + ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The shareholder would be interested that the auditor reaches the level of x that minimizes these 
expected costs. 
Now we introduce an observation, which is crucial for the question of this article. Assume that the 
shareholder holds a diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds and money and neither plans to save nor 
to disinvest. The shareholder uses the dividends and interest payments for consumption. In that case 
the only motivation for the selling and buying shares is to improve the structure of the portfolio, to 
spread risks and to to accommodate the portfolio to changing overall economic indicators. In that 
case the ex ante probability of buying and selling a particular share in any period must be equal. 
The shareholder therefore expects ex ante with a certain probability, that he will either buy or sell 
shares of a particular company in any period. If he buys, and the auditor overvalues the company 
this will cause him losses. If he sells the auditor causes him an equal gain. The probabilities of 
these two events are equal. Now call the probability that the shareholder will trade (buy or sell)
shares of a particular company in a particular period u. Then the expected loss, given the audit led 
to an overvaluation in this period is u(a- a l-a +r)=u(r-al).
The  probability  that  the  shareholder  will  not  trade  in  a  particular  period  is then (1-u) and his 
expected loss in case the auditor overvalued the shares is (1-u)(r-al). Therefore the shareholder in a 
secondary market faces the following total expected losses, including the costs for the audit.
[ ] x ) a r ( w )) x ( q 1 ( x ) a r ( u ) a r )( u 1 ( w )) x ( q 1 ( PL
l l l + ￿ ￿ = + ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ =
This is the expected private loss, if the damage occurs. Differentiating with respect to x  yields the 
first order condition
) a r ( w
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This yields a cost level of care (x), which is optimal for the shareholder, but it is also socially 
optimal. (Compare with the first order condition in (8) in section BIII above). The shareholder´s 
private interest in avoiding the loss is not larger than the interest of the society at large in an 
efficient organization of the capital market. One can therefore argue that there is no rationale to 
assume any implicit contract between shareholders and auditors, which would give rise to a liability 
which is stricter than under tort law. Pragmatism recommends to rule out any contractual liability 
under these circumstances. The shareholder has no special willingness to pay for his protection
which improves his legal position beyond that, which he enjoys under tort law.
Admittedly  this  result  arises  only  if  the  shareholder  neither  plans  to  save  nor  to  disinvest 
continually over time. If for instance shareholders are young they tend to save into their portfolio 
and therefore buy more shares in any period than they sell. If shareholders are old they disinvest 
and are likely to sell more shares in any period than they buy. There exist other conditions which 
might lead to a constellation under which shareholders face ex ante probabilities of  u2 and u3 which 
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lead to a different willingness to pay for the auditor. But we believe that such considerations would 
be too artificial to have any effect on how the liability rule for auditors should be set up.
II. Buyers´ of assets willingness to pay for protection in a primary market
These considerations however change if an audit is given for a firm for the reason to sell the firm or 
to go public and to inform potential buyers about the value of the firm. This constellation is not 
different from any asset valuation by an expert, which is made to inform the buying side and is 
therefore a transaction cost. Here the rationale of the audit and the expertise in general is to reduce 
the asymmetric information between the seller. It is obvious that the buyer has a willingness to pay 
for the reliability of this expertise, which is determined by the private losses he incurs, when he 
buys an overvalued firm. He is therefore interested in a higher level of care of the auditor than a 
shareholder  at  the  secondary  market. And  the  shareholder  is  a  buyer  or  a  seller  with  equal 
probability.  The  only  reason  why  in  such  cases  sellers  and  not  potential  buyers  conclude  the 
contract with the auditor is, that the expertise is a public good, valuable for all buyers and that free 
riding  or  unnecessary  duplications  of  expertise  would  result  if  buyers  concluded  the  auditing 
contract. 
The buyer in a primary market wants the auditor to minimize the sum of his expected private losses 
and auditing costs which are in this constellation
[ ] x a a w )) x ( q 1 ( PL l + ￿ ￿ =
This yields the first order condition of 
) a a ( w
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It also yields an x* as the efficient cost of care, which is higher than in the previous analysis, when 
the shareholder has to determine his willingness to pay for the audit not knowing whether he will 
gain or lose as a result of the auditor´s mistake. From an economic point of view there is therefore 
no reason to restrict liability. The due level of care depends on the losses of the buyers in case they 
buy  an  overvalued  firm.  It  is  therefore  conceptually  higher  than  for  the  secondary  market.
Incentives should be given to reach this care level. Normal negligence should trigger liability. This 
is in the interest of the buyer who is willing to finance the auditor as part of his transactions cost. 
This result can be obtained either by assuming an implicit contract between the buyer and the 
auditor  or  by  extending  the  protective  consequences  of  the  contract  between  the  firm  and  the 
auditor to the buyer or by a liability regime sui generis, which however leads to legal consequences 
as laid down in contract law. In Germany the result of liability for simple negligence can also be 
obtained within tort law (§ 823 Abs.2), if one interprets the regulatory statutes pertaining to the 
work of auditors as protection laws (Schutzgesetze). All these legal concepts would trigger liability 
in case of simple negligence with a negligence standard that reflects the possible private losses of 
the buyer as a consequence of an overvaluation. Whatever legal form is chosen, the borderline 
between a stricter and a less strict liability rule for the auditor should be whether the expertise was 
made for the secondary or the primary market.
In this context it is now possible to give a comment on the much debated Caparo vs. Dickman case
in Britain
18. Here a company had ordered an audit for the internal use of the management. An 
18 See Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman and Others. 1990. 1 All England Law Reports 568.
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outside investor received this report. He noticed that the value of the firm given in the balance sheet 
was substantially higher than the market value at the stock exchange. He bought the majority of the 
company  only  to  learn  that  the  market  value  was  correct  and  that  the  auditor  had  negligently 
overvalued the assets. The House of Lords denied compensation. Given the analysis in this article 
this decision was in line with economic considerations, as the auditor did not know and could not 
know that his audit was used for a particular transaction. Therefore, the private loss of a buyer was 
not part of his price for the audit. 
E. Conclusion
Auditor´s liability leads to a compensation of pure financial loss. It has been argued in the law and 
economics literature that the restriction of damage compensation in such cases is justified, as in this 
group of cases private losses of claimants are higher than the social losses which might lead to 
overcompensation and overdeterrence. In this article it is shown, that overcompensation of the 
victims leads to overdeterrence of the auditors, if the level of care for auditing is not strictly defined 
and only known as a probability distribution. However, overdeterrence can be reduced or even 
eliminated, if the liability for negligence is relaxed to a lower level such as gross negligence. It is 
also argued that this solution should be restricted to the activity of auditors in secondary markets, 
such as audit of the yearly balance sheet. A shareholder who operates in such a market has in 
general no willingness to pay for an auditing effort, which is higher than the optimal effort for a 
well functioning capital market. 
If however the audit is exclusively made for the sale of a firm or an initial public offering the 
efficient level of care of the auditor should reflect the potential private losses and be higher than in 
secondary markets. Simple negligence should trigger liability. Here the buyers’ willingness to pay 
for his protection is higher than in the secondary market. Consequently, liability should be stricter. 
One way of obtaining this result could be to extend contractual liability to the relation between the 
auditor and the buyer of a firm or of shares in an initial public offering.
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